Gender and Sex Scandals

Two recent articles on sex scandals and gender:

This NYT article maintains that women get caught in sex scandals much less frequently than men do. The author wonders whether this points to a deeper difference between men and women:

"'The shorthand of it is that women run for office to do something, and men run for office to be somebody,' said Debbie Walsh, director of the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University. 'Women run because there is some public issue that they care about, some change they want to make, some issue that is a priority for them, and men tend to run for office because they see this as a career path.'" This is interesting, especially if you consider it in light of Jane Addams's arguments for why women participate in politics--because it isn't possible for women to be good mothers without a larger concern for their community as a whole.

Harvey Mansfield's article, "Manliness and Morality" considers the behavior of Arnold Schwarzenegger and Dominique Strauss-Kahn. He maintains that these spectacles point us to some old-fashioned truths: One is that "Men are more adventurous and aggressive than women"--"It certainly seems strange that being capable of rape can make a person better qualified for greatness, but it’s probably true." Another is that "Women are more vulnerable than men"--"The enforcement of law and morality is done mainly by men or by women with the strength of men. ... Women need men to save them from men." I'm slightly uncomfortable with his gender stereotyping here, but not too, too uncomfortable (he really does qualify everything he says--honestly, I have a feeling it's because he doesn't believe in nature, so the essentialism game is a little harder for him to play). What I have more serious qualms about is his last point. Before that last point, he writes super interestingly about morality:

"Morality has a hold on all human beings, and it does not easily accept excuses. It is more powerful than the cynics believe. It can be very democratic in raising the low and abasing the high. Morality and democracy are both levelers; they encourage each other and they take satisfaction in each other. Democracy on its own doesn’t care for moral relativism; only democratic intellectuals want that."

However, his last point is a caution about morality:

"Morality wants to be sovereign over all other considerations, but it doesn’t deserve to be. Morality when sovereign makes moralism, an ugly posture that breeds fanaticism. So, whether it’s because I have studied Machiavelli or am now a grand--father wise in the world I couldn’t say, but I can think of scenarios in which Dominique Strauss-Kahn might be excused (still assuming he is guilty). Many French now think that he has been the victim of a plot, which seems far-fetched and against the evidence. But suppose he were; could that plot not be justified if it removed a very bad man from a situation in which he could do much harm? And, on the contrary, supposing he were a very good man essential to the good of his country, could not another plot have been mounted to cover up his unfortunate moral failing? Working out these possibilities will keep you from feeling too much moral indignation. Not too much of it, but not too little, either."

My point is not that political leaders must have zero moral failings. I don't think, though, that I'd be willing to excuse attempted rape. Plus, if you do buy Mansfield's earlier points, laws to enforce morality become even more important given women's weakness.